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Supreme Court Docket # 41254 
Bonner County CV2010-1560 
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District for Bonner County. 
Honorable District Judge John T. Mitchell presiding. 
Laurel Evans, appearing In Propria Persona 
Residing at 46700 Highway 200, Suite 303, Hope, near (83836], State of Idaho, 
for Appellant 
D. Toby Mclaughlin 
Residing at 3 21 South First A venue; Sandpoint, near [83864 ], State of Idaho, 
for Respondent. 
Page i of i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
I-ARGUMENT 
1. THE RESPONDENT'S BRIEF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH I.A.R. 35 
11 
111 
2. NO NEW ISSUES ON APPEAL 4 
3. MISREPRESENTATION BY RESPONDENT IN BRIEF 5 
4. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 8 
5. DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 12 
6. MORE ON EQUITY 14 
II COSTS 18 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 22 
Page ii of ii 
Haight v Dale's Used Cars, Inc., 139 Idaho 853, 87 P.3d 962, n.l (2003) 2 
Harrison v. Binni on, 14 7 Idaho 645, 649, 214 P.3d 631, 635 (2009) 12 
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238,244 (1944). 11 
Hoult v. Hmt!t, 57 F.3d 1, 6 (I st Cir.1995) 10, 14, 15 
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990). 7 
Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 
9 P.3d 1204, 1211 (2000). 2 
In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614,623 (1995) 5 
Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 779 P.2d 15 (1989) 20 
Intern. Business Mach. Corp. v. Lawhorn, 
106 Idaho 194,197,677 P.2d 507,510, (Idaho.App. 1984) 16 
Klaprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601,615, 69 S.Ct. 384,390 (1949) 10 
Knight Ins., Inc., v. Knight, 109 Idaho 56, 59, 704 P.2d 960, 963 (Ct.App.1985). 8 
Long v. State Insurance Fund, 90 P.2d 973 ( 1939). 5 
Matter of Marriage of Sellers, 39 Or.App. 647, 593 P.2d 1191 (1979) 16 
McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 55 I, 82 P.3d 833 (2003) 18 
Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224,235,220 P.3d 580,591 (2009) 18 
Mitchell v. Robert DeA1ario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960) 9 
Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 877, 187 P.3d 1247, 1252 (Ct. App. 2008) 4 
Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington Fed. Savings, 
135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001) 18 
Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm 'n, 141 Idaho 129, 133, 106 P.3d 455, 459 (2005). 8 
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc., 514 U.S. 211. 234-235 (1995) 
Power County v, Evans Bros. Land & Livestock Co., 
43 Idaho 158,252 P. 182 (1926) 
Page iv of iv 
10, 11 
15 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
CASES: 
Allen v. Ketchen, 100 P. 1052 (1909) 9 
Appel v. LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 139, 15 P.3d 1141, 1147 (2000) 21 
Athey v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 165 P. 1116, 1118 (Idaho 1917) 4 
Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 196 P.3d 325, rehearing denied, (2008) 12 
Backman v. Douglas, 46 Idaho 671,270 P. 618 (1928) 15 
Brower v. E.J DuPont De Nemours & Co., 
117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990) 20 
Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet. ) 195, 203, 10 L. Ed. 123. 9 
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 214-215, 70 S.Ct. 587,596 (1950) 11 
Davis v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, 
30 Idaho 469,471,943 P.2d 59, 61 (Ct.App. 1997) 15 
Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash.2d 1,448 P.2d 490,494 (1968) 10, 15 
Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 148 Idaho 427,430,224 P.3d 494,497 (2009) 12 
Downey v. Vavold, 144 Idaho 592, 596, 166 P.3d 382, 386 (2007) 18 
Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 
133 Idaho 644,647,991 P.2d 369,372 (Ct.App.1998) 8, 10, 15 
Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575 5,6, 10 
Employment Security Agency v. Joint Class "A" School District No. I 51, 
88 Idaho 384,400 P.2d 377 (1965) 12,13 
Estate a/Collins v. Giest, 143 Idaho 821,153 P.3d 1167 (2007) 12 
Falls Creek Timber Co. v. Day, 39 Idaho 495,228 P. 313 (1924) 15, 16 
Glancy v. Williams, 49 Idaho 594,290 P. 1054 (1930) 16 
Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 584, 226 P.3d 524, 526(2010) 12 
Page iii of iii 
Reinwald v. Eveland, 119 Idaho 111, 112, 803 P.2d 1017, 1018 (Ct.App. 1991) 8 
Roe Family Servs. v. Doe, 139 Idaho 930, 939, 88 P.3d 749, 758 (2004) 21 
Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991) 4 
Smith v. EC Sterling, 1 Idaho 128, Held note #2 (Terr.Idaho 1867) 4 
Spencer v. Jameson, 147 Idaho 497,500,211 P.3d 106, 115 (2009). 15 
Sprinkler Irrigation Co., Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., Inc., 
139 Idaho 691, 85 P. 3d 667, 674 (2004) 2, 3, 19 
State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002) 7 
State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992) 4 
State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281,287,297 P.3d 244,250 (2013) 7 
State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652 (2000) 7 
State v. Lenon, 143 Idaho 415, 417, 146 P.3d 681, 683 (Ct.App. 2005) 4 
State Dept. of Parks· v. Idaho Dept. of Water Adm in., 
96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974). 13 
Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., 
150 Idaho 521, 529-30, 248 P.3d 1256, 1264-65 (2011) 20 
Storey Constr., Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401,411,224 P.3d 468,478 (2009) 21 
Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657, 962 P.2d 1041 (1998) 20 
Torix v. Allred, 100 Idaho 905, 911, 606 P.2d 1334. 1340 (1980) 20 
Twenty-Seventh Street, Inc. v. Johnson, 716 P .2d 210 (Mont.1986) 16 
Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 41 P.3d 220 (2002). 19 
Weaver v. Searle Bros., 129 Idaho 497,927 P.2d 887, 892-93 (1996) 2 
Westway Const., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dept.. 139 Idaho 107, I 04 P.3d 946 (2004) 12 
Whittle v. Seehusan, 113 Idaho 852, 748 P.2d 1382 (Idaho.App. 1987) 16 
Page v of v 
CONSTITITION: 
Section 18 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Idaho 
Section 13 of Article V of the Constitution of the State of Idaho 
STATUTES: 
Idaho Code § 1-705 
Idaho Code § 1-2311 
Idaho Code § 1-2312 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) 
Idaho Code § 12-121 
COURT RULES: 
I.AR. Rule 11.1 [now I.A.R. Rule 11.2.] 
I.AR. Rule 11.2 
I.AR. Rule 35(a) 
I.AR. Rule 35(b) 
I.AR. Rule 35(b)(6) 
I.R.C.P. Rule 38(b) 
I.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) 
I.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(4) 
IRCP Rule 81 (k) 
IRCP Rule 81 (1) 
I.R.C.P. Rule 8l(p); 
I.R.C.P. Rule 8l(q) 
Page vi ofvi 
6 
4, 5, 9, 
12, 13, 14 

















3 C.J. 675, § 549 
11 charles A. Wright et al., wright J\1iller & Kane, 
Federal Practice & Procedure§ 2862, at 326-29 (2d ed.1995) 
Judicial Branch - Idaho Bluebook on the Internet 






1. THE RESPONDENT'S BRIEF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH I.A.R. 35 
Preliminarily, Appellant must object to a large portion of the Respondent's reply brief. 
The Respondent does not offer argument or analysis of its own relating to multiple issues on 
appeal raised by the Appellant error committed in not adhering to state decisis, jurisdiction being 
asserted in derogation of state law using statutory construction, legislative authority over 
prescribing appellate proceedings, error in each finding or fact and conclusion of law as decided 
by the presiding judge of the District Court, and other argument(s). Instead, the Respondent 
simply incorporates the same arguments used in their response to Appellant's Motion to Vacate 
Judgment as its argument on appeal. Brief of Respondent, and Response to Motion to Vacate 
Judgment, Respondent's filed Amended Response to Appellant's Motion to Vacate Judgment and 
Award of Attorney Fees and Costs on May 2nd, 2013 R Vol. II pages 388-396; Respondent's 
original Response there was an Affidavit in Support. See R Vol II, pages 380-384. This does not 
appear to be a practice consistent with the rules. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35 (b) (6) states: 
Argument. The argument shall contain the contentions of the respondent with 
respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon. 
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This rule seems to contemplate that the Respondent should be drafting their own 
arguments with respect to the issues presented on appeal, not simply bringing back the same 
arguments brought in response to Appellant's Motion to Vacate Judgment. Respondent's brief 
does not contain their contentions in opposition to the issues brought and discussed with 
authorities at length in Appellant's brief and does not state the reasons therefore why Appellant's 
argument is incorrect, nor does it cite authorities, statutes, or parts of the transcript which oppose 
Appellant's argument as required to do, pursuant to IAR Rule 35(b)(6). Not even a scintilla 
attempt to comply with IAR Rule 35(b)(6) and most of it off-point. 
If an Appellant fails to include argument with respect to any issue on appeal, that issue is 
considered waived by the Supreme Court. Weaver v. Searle Bros., 129 Idaho 497, 927 P.2d 887, 
892-93 (1996); Haight v Dale's Used Cars, Inc., 139 Idaho 853, 87 P.3d 962, n. l (2003): 
"Because Haight has provided insufficient argument and no authority to support his contentions, 
the rule will not be relaxed and these issues will not be considered on appeal." 
Of course, in an appeal the burden of proof rests with the Appellant, and a Respondent's 
failure to argue an issue in its brief does not mandate a reversal of the District Court's decision 
under the theory of a waiver. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 9 P.3d 1204, 
1211 (2000). 
Nonetheless, there is still the rule, and while the Court in Idaho Power, id., did not find 
that a violation of the rule on the part of the Respondent warranted a reversal, it did not close the 
door on any possible sanction. In Sprinkler Irrigation Co., Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., Inc., 139 
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Idaho 691, 85 P. 3d 667, 674 (2004), the Court found an attorney's compliance with I.AR. 35 (a) 
so deficient that it triggered sanctions under I.AR. 11.1 [now I.AR. Rule 11.2.] The Court 
sanctioned the attorney by requiring him to pay attorney fees and costs jointly and severally with 
his client. 
In the immediate appeal, the Court should determine and state on the record whether the 
Respondent has complied with I.AR. 35(b), even if such determination has no bearing on the 
eventual outcome of the Appellant's case. 
While the Respondent has no burden of proof to meet in their arguments, the rule is 
nonetheless mandatory and imposes a duty: "The argument shall contain the contentions of the 
respondent with respect to the issues presented on appeal .... " The adversarial system works best 
when both sides actually compete. 
At a minimum, failure to comply with Rule 35(b)(6) should be considered contemptuous 
conduct towards the Court's Rules which the Supreme Court saw it fit to adopt into procedural 
law. A properly researched brief aids the development of arguments and assists the Court in their 
decision-making process. 
If a violation of the rule is found, the articulation of such in the Court's eventual decision 
should in itself constitute a sanction to be imposed. 
Based upon the foregoing the Appellant has filed a Motion for Sanctions and is 
incorporated herein by its reference, for disposition of these issues, as the Court deems proper 
and just. 
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2. NO NEW ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Appellant must also object to Respondent attempting to bring new issues before this 
appellate court not raised in the lower court. Generally, issues not raised below may not be 
considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Lenon, 143 Idaho 415, 41 7, 146 P.3d 681, 683 
(Ct.App. 2005), State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192,195,824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). Issues may not be 
raised for the first time on appeal, Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 
(1991); Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 877, 187 P.3d 1247, 1252 (Ct. App. 2008). This 
standard is traced back to Smith v. E. C Sterling, 1 Idaho 128, Held note #2 (Terr.Idaho 1867). 
Respondent is misrepresenting to the Court that it was raised by either side of IRCP Rules 
81 (k) and 81 (]). This is a new issue in Respondent's Brief starting at the bottom of page 11 and 
continues to page 12, which has never been raised in the lower court. Although this Court can 
look at anything, generally, this Court has not done so from its territorial days to present. 
Appellant sees no reason why it should start now. 
'"An appellate court can only derive its jurisdiction from the Constitution and statutes of 
the state.' Penny v. Nez Pere es County, 4 Idaho 642, 43 P. 570 .. ,." cited from Athey v. Oregon 
Short Line R. Co., 165 P. 1116, 1118 (Idaho 1917). Looking from the Constitution of the State of 
Idaho the authority starting from Section 13 of Article V with the Legislature's authority to 
prescribe modes for appeal, to the legislature prescribing the mode of appeal from the Small 
Claims Department of the Magistrate's Division to an attorney magistrate in the Magistrate 
Division of the District Court in statute. " ... [T]he right to appeal and procedure on appeal are 
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provided for in the constitution and fixed by statute, and it is not within discretion of court to 
hear an appeal or not to hear hear it. Article V. section 13 of the constitution ... " Long v. State 
Insurance Fund, 90 P.2d 973 ( 1939). 
In Appellant's initial briefing it was shown that pursuant to the aforementioned chain of 
authority of substantive law, jurisdictional authority to hear an appeal from the Small Claims 
Department lies with an attorney magistrate of the Magistrate Division. 
Procedural rules are not substantive law; they merely "pertain to the essentially 
mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are 
effectuated." In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623 (1995). 
Appellant has filed a Motion for Sanctions on this issue pursuant to IAR Rule 11.2 and is 
incorporated herein by its reference. It's content is self-explanatory and the relief sought is simple 
and just. 
3. MISREPRESENTATION BY RESPONDENT IN BRIEF 
Appellant must also object to Respondent's deliberate misrepresentation of Appellant's 
claimed error. Respondent is under the misguided impression that "Appellant contends it was 
error for the magistrate division to transfer the case." Respondent's Brief page 9. That's 
Incorrect! In an indirect way, Respondent does admit that the magistrate division was acting in 
their appellate capacity when the Motions to Amend and Transfer were decided. Appellant is 
contending that it was error for the magistrate's division to have granted both the amendment and 
the transfer in derogation to LC. § 1-2311 and§ 1-2312 and stare decisis of Drumright v. Scheer, 
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S-CV-1999-1575, decided by the Honorable John T. Mitchell, which is still the leading case in 
the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho. Judge Mitchell's decisions are on the internet for 
everybody to have access too. He is the only judge who has the guts to believe in himself that his 
judgment is righteous and correct. In his Memorandum and Order from the Drumright v. Scheer, 
S-CV-1999-1575. R. Vol. II, page 366, lines 5-8 Judge Mitchell specifically recognized that the 
District Court lacks jurisdiction to hear a small claims appeal, to wit: 
"The law changed just after Gilbert was decided. In, 1985, Idaho Session Law, 
Chapter 167, § 1, page 443 changed I.C. § 1-2311 and the small claims appeal 
process. Today the law requires an appeal from the small claims department to be 
heard as a trial de nova before an attorney magistrate. I. C. § 1-2311; I.R.C.P. 
8l(n); 81(o)(2); 83(b). The rules state that an appeal from small claims 
department shall be conducted as a trial de nova before an attorney magistrate. 
I.R.C.P. 8l(n); 81(o)(2); 83(b)." 
Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575. R. Vol. II, page 366, lines 5-8. With no other higher Court 
having a decision which contradicts its judgment, it is the law under the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Two questions are apparent. First - Why did Judge Mitchell dishonor himself in not 
abiding by his created stare decisis of Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575 in derogation of 
Section 18, of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Idaho, by denying Appellant's Motion 
to Vacate Judgment? I can't answer this, but it happens ALL the time, in Northern Idaho. 
Somebody ought to do something about it, don't ya think? And Second - Why didn't the 
Respondent offer ANY argument or analysis of its own on such a pivotal question of law before 
this Court on appeal? It is because stare decisis of Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575, 
decided by the Honorable John T. Mitchell, is absolutely correct, on every point oflaw. 
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I recognize that this Court should not consider overruling controlling precedent if the 
Court can dispose of the appeal on other grounds. Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 
72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990). 
"[T]he rule of stare decisis dictates that we follow [ controlling precedent] unless 
it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or 
unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and 
remedy continued injustice." 
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990) cited from State 
v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652 (2000). "Stare decisis dictates that we follow 
controlling precedent, unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or 
unwise, or unless overturning it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and 
remedy continued injustice." Stale v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281,287,297 P.3d 244,250 (2013); State 
v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002). Stare decisis is not a confining phenomenon 
but rather a principle of law. State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652 (2000). And in this 
case the stare decisis of Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575 should be upheld and expounded 
upon by this Court as law from this appeal. 
Appellant has filed a Motion for Sanctions on this issue pursuant to IAR Rule 11.2 and is 
incorporated herein by its reference. It's content is self-explanatory and the relief sought is simple 
and just. 
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4. STANDARD OF REVIE\V 
Where grounds for a motion are non-discretionary, such as m Rule 60(b )( 4) motions, 
however, the motion is reviewed under the de nova (free review) standard. Reinwald v. Eveland, 
119 Idaho 111,112,803 P.2d 1017, 1018 (Ct.App. 1991). Citing, Knight Ins., Inc. v. Knight, 109 
Idaho 56, 704 P.2d 960 (Ct.App. 1985) in which the Justices stated in that appeal that appellate 
review for non-discretionary relief under a Rule 60(b )( 4) motion and that the standard of review 
is one upon law which they exercise a de nova/free review over it, to wit: 
"In turn, Rule 60(b) enunciates a variety of grounds upon which relief from a 
judgment may be obtained. Some grounds - such as mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise or excusable neglect under subsection (b )(1) - allow discretionary relief. 
Others, such as the voidness of a judgment under subsection (b)(4), create a 
nondiscretionary entitlement to relief. This distinction is critical for appellate 
review. Where discretionary grounds are invoked, the standard of review is abuse 
of discretion. Where nondiscretionary grounds are asserted, the question presented 
is one of law upon which the appellate court exercises free review." 
Knight Ins., Inc. v. Knight, l 09 Idaho 56, 59-60, 704 P.2d 960, 963-64 (Ct.App. 1985). See also 
Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho 644, 647, 991 P.2d 369, 371 (Ct.App.1998). Similarly, 
whether a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to I.R.C.P. l 2(b) was properly granted is a 
question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm 'n, 
141 Idaho 129, 133, 106 P.3d 455,459 (2005). 
Appellant's Motion to Vacate Judgment was brought pursuant to a non-discretionary 
standard within Rule 60(b) of Rule 60(b )( 4 ). Therefore the appellate court exercises free review 
"de nova" and is not under the abuse of discretion standard of appellate review. Knight Ins., Inc. 
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v. Knight, I 09 Idaho 56, 59-60, 704 P.2d 960, 963-64 (Ct.App. 1985). 
When a Motion under this Rule is brought under discretionary grounds, equitable 
remedies can be employed to correct errors in the common law. It is also axiomatic that parties 
to an action acting in equity require that the court follow its maxims which include the maxim of 
"equity follows the law." Allen v. Ketchen, 100 P. 1052 (1909); Appellant's Brief, pages 18-20. 
In the case of Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960) the 
Justices stated in their decision "As this Court has long ago recognized, 'there is inherent in the 
Courts of Equity a jurisdiction to ... give effect to the policy of the legislature.' Clark v. Smith, 
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195, 203, 10 L. Ed. 123." 
In the instant case an appeal was filed by Respondent from the Small Claims Department 
of the Magistrate Division to the Magistrate Division. This State's Legislature mandated under 
authority of Section 13 of Article V of the Constitution of the State of Idaho mandated that an 
appeal from Small Claims Department of the Magistrate Division must be brought and heard by 
an attorney magistrate of the Magistrate's Division. A non-discretionary Motion to Vacate 
Judgment was timely filed by Appellant challenging the District Court taking jurisdiction in its 
appellate capacity over the Small Claims appeal to be tried as a trial de novo. The question of 
jurisdiction is strictly a question of law and not equity. The State of Idaho Legislature mandated 
policy that a Small Claims appeal shall be conducted only by an attorney magistrate of the 
Magistrate's Division, which was not done in this case, in error. 
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If this Court allows a district court judge to try a Small Claims appeal as a trial de novo 
would create not only a violation of the policies of this State, but an inequity of justice. If this 
Court upholds the district court's denial on the Motion to Vacate judgment challenging 
jurisdiction of the District Court to hear a Small Claims appeal would create not only a violation 
of the policies of this State, but an inequity of justice. As for example, if this Court does not 
uphold that a judgment is void when a "court's action amounts to a plain usurpation of power 
constituting a violation of due process." Houlr ,,. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1995); accord Dike 
v. Dike, 75 Wash.2d 1, 448 P.2d 490, 494 (1968); 11 charles A. Wright et al., wright Miller & 
Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2862, at 326-29 (2d ed.1995). Citing Dragotoiu v. 
Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho 644,647,991 P.2d 369,371 (Ct.App.1998). 
If this Court does not hold that final judgments and determinations held in the district 
court are not binding as stare decisis on other district court judges or lower court magistrates it 
would create not only a violation of the law, but an inequity of justice. 
"In simple English," Rule 60(b) vests power in courts "adequate to enable them to vacate 
judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice." Klaprott v. United States, 
335 U.S. 601, 615, 69 S.Ct. 384, 390 (1949)(emphasis supplied). The Rule is "simply the 
recitation of pre-existing judicial power" to set aside judgments which are unfair. Plaut v. 
Spendthrift Farm Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 234-235 (1995). "Rule 60(b) ... reflects and confirms the 
courts' own inherent and discretionary power, 'firmly established in English practice long before 
the foundation of our Republic,' to set aside a judgment whose enforcement would work 
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inequity." Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 lJ .S. at 233-234, quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. 
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238,244 (1944). 
However, a motion brought under this rule is under non-discretionary grounds, as in this 
case, the law must be followed and was not by the Magistrate who heard the Motion to Amend 
the Complaint and Motion to Transfer in derogation of stare decisis of the Drumwright v. Scheer 
decision issued by the Honorable John T., Mitchell. The District Court Judge heard the trial de 
novo without jurisdiction also failed to sua sponte correct its lack of jurisdiction. Then, another 
Judge denied the Motion to Vacate Judgment improperly under equitable grounds brought by the 
Respondent. "The courts must be kept open to guard against injustice through judicial error." 
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 214-215, 70 S.Ct. 587, 596 (1950). Therefore the standard of 
review should be the standard of free review by this Court. 
In the exercise of free review by this Court and based upon Appellant's first brief further 
buttressed by this brief, along with Appellant's Motion to Vacate Judgment its briefs and 
affidavits in support, all orders and judgments to grant the Motion to Amend Complaint and 
Motion to Transfer Transfer, orders and judgments from District Court should be rendered void 
by this Court and the Judgment denying the Motion to Vacate Judgment to be found vacated with 
necessary orders to have Appellant's $10,000 for attorney fees and costs should be returned to 
the Appellant from the jurisdictionally defective appeal tried by the District Court as a trial de 
nova Ordered the Appellant to pay the Respondent $11,885.00 in attorney fees and costs on an 
appellate process which requires only costs to be paid by the loser of $50.00. 
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It is also worth noting that "The interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to 
free review." Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 584, 226 P.3d 524, 526 (2010) citing 
Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 148 Idaho 427, 430, 224 P.3d 494, 497 (2009); Harrison v. 
Binnion, 147 Idaho 645,649,214 P.3d 631,635 (2009). 
Appellant has filed a Motion for Sanctions on this issue pursuant to JAR Rule 11.2 and is 
incorporated herein by its reference. It's content is self-explanatory and the relief sought is 
simple and just. 
S. DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
Appellant clearly and meticulously demonstrated that the more recent statute of I.C. §§ 1-
2311 and 1-2312 has precedence over the older statute of I.C. § 1-705 based upon the rules of 
statutory construction. Respondent had no rebuttal to this position or any other, ignoring every 
aspect of the law unfavorable to him as argued in Appellant's brief, but decided instead rather than 
act in some sort of good faith to concede a position that he was unable to support in law. 
Briefly and once again, reciting the two statutory construction maxims employed m 
Appellant's initial brief: First, "Where two statutes appear to apply to the same case or subject 
matter, the specific statute will control over the more general." Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 
196 P.3d 325, rehearing denied, (2008); Estate al Collins v. Giest, 143 Idaho 821, 153 P.3d 1167 
(2007); Westway Const., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 139 Idaho 107, 104 P.3d 946 (2004). And 
the Second, "It is also clear that where two statutes conflict the latest expression of the legislative 
will must prevail. Employment Security Agency v. Joint Class "A" School District No. 151, 88 
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Idaho 384,400 P.2d 377 (1965)." State Dept. of Parks v. Idaho Dept. of Water Admin., 96 Idaho 
440,530 P.2d 924 (1974). 
The 1969 Session Laws, had I.C. § 1-705 being the latest expression of the legislature, 
but had I.C. §§ 1-2311 and 1-2312 were the more specific statutes to control over the more 
general one ofl.C. § 1-705. There was not any third way to break the tie if statutory construction 
was necessary in a case. In 1985 the legislature by amending LC. §§ 1-2311 and 1-2312 gave 
both maxims of construction of statute of latest expression of the legislature and more specific 
statutes to control over the more general to I. C. §§ 1-2311 and 1-2312. This then has left I.C. §§ 
1-2311 and 1-2312 to have complete precedence over I.C. § 1-705 on both counts of statutory 
construction. Coincidentally, the legislature did this just after this Court decided Gilbert v. 
Moore, 108 Idaho 165,697 P.2d 1179. Since Gilbert, there really has not been any other case 
dealing with questions of appellate jurisdiction over a small claims appeal, which has somewhat 
changed due to the amendment after Gilbert, as is at least to the issues raised in this case. 
Additional proof can be seen emanating from the justices of the Supreme Court who 
adopted IRCP Rule 3 8(b) in which its language clearly and undeniably recognizes only an 
attorney magistrate can hear an appeal from the Small Claims Department of the Magistrate 
Division. 
Respondent on page 9 states the following, "Appellant assumes that the district court was 
acting in an appellate capacity. "Appellant does not assume that the district court was acting in an 
appellate capacity! It was acting in excess of any capacity from LC.§ 1-705. There are three (3) 
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jurisdictions. Let's go through them one-by-one. ONE - General Jurisdiction, which the Small 
Claims Department entered judgment in favor of the Appellant, disposing general jurisdiction or 
original jurisdiction due to the case originating in the Small Claims Department. TWO - Issuance 
of writs, nobody in this case was seeking a writ, so it is inapplicable here. And THREE - Limited 
Appellate Jurisdiction, which Appellant has already shown not to exist in my briefing. The 
ONLY way the district court could have had jurisdiction is, if there is an invisible number 4 in 
I.C. § 1-705 and that in order to see it you needed a special pair of glasses, like in the movie 
"They Live" starring Rowdy Roddy Pipper to see it. But, then how does that give Notice to me 
under the due process clause? 
Respondent's several assumptions are obviously incorrect, but shows outrageous conduct 
of untrue accusations and innuendo to place words in the mouth of somebody else just to sway the 
Court. Respondent knows that Appellant has clearly articulated the opposite position. 
That is why Appellant has filed a Motion for Sanctions on this issue pursuant to IAR Rule 
11.2 and is incorporated herein by its reference. It's content is self-explanatory and the relief 
sought is simple and just. 
6. MORE ON EQUITY 
Respondent asserts on page 14 another dead issue of judicial estoppel. Appellant re-
asserts that the district court was acting without jurisdiction, and all orders, rulings, judgments 
are void. Appellant's Brief, page 22; and the district Court's actions being void amounted to a 
plain usurpation of power constituting a violation of due process." Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 6 
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(1st Cir.1995); accord Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash.2d 1, 448 P.2d 490, 494 (1968); 11 charles A. 
Wright et al., wright Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2862, at 326-29 (2d 
ed.1995). Citing Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho 644,647,991 P.2d 369,371 (Ct.App.1998). 
But also, "It is well understood that equitable principles cannot supersede the positive enactments 
of the legislature." Davis v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, 130 Idaho 469, 471, 943 P.2d 59, 
61 (Ct.App. 1997) cited from Spencer v. Jameson, 147 Idaho 497,500,211 P.3d 106, 115 (2009). 
Therefore, all the other equitable claims for the district court to act on the appeal from the 
Small Claims Department and conduct the appellate process of a trial de novo as required by an 
attorney magistrate of the magistrate division, it too must fail on jurisdictional grounds. 
Appellant has filed a Motion for Sanctions on this issue pursuant to IAR Rule 11.2 and is 
incorporated herein by its reference. It's content is self-explanatory and the relief sought is simple 
and just. 
7. MOOT ISSUE FOR APPEAL DUE TO SATISFACTION 
Respondent asserts on pages 15 and 16 the issue of that the appeal is moot due to 
satisfaction. Once again Respondent fails to comply with IAR Rule 35(b)(6) in not being 
responsive to the argument briefed in Appellant's appeal. 
"Satisfaction of a judgment by execution is involuntary, and does not cut off the judgment 
debtor's right to appeal. E.g. Backman v. Douglas, 46 Idaho 671, 270 P. 618 (1928); Power 
County v, Evans Bros. Land & Livestock Co., 43 Idaho 158, 252 P. 182 (1926); Falls Creek 
Timber Co. v. Day, 39 Idaho 495, 228 P. 313 (1924). In Falls Creek, the court stated, '[t]he 
Page 15 of22 
involuntary payment .... [in J satisfaction of a judgment .... does not affect the right of appeal.' Id. 
at 497, 228 P. at 313 (quoting 3 C.J. 675, § 549)."' cited from Intern. Business Mach. Corp. v. 
La-whorn, 106 Idaho 194, 197, 677 P.2d 507, 510, (Idaho.App. 1984). "In other words, a _judgment 
paid, in full or in part, under legal coercion remains ripe for judicial review. Twenty-Seventh 
Street, Inc. v. Johnson, 716 P.2d 210 (Mont.1986); Matter of Marriage of Sellers, 39 Or.App. 64 7, 
593 P.2d 1191 (1979)." cited from Whittle v. Seehusan, 113 Idaho 852, 748 P.2d 1382 (Idaho.App. 
1987). See also Glancy v. Williams, 49 Idaho 594, 290 P. 1054 ( l 930)(Mere payment of costs, 
unlike acceptance of amount of judgment, does not waive error in proceedings, or right of 
appeal.). 
In Appellant's First Brief on page 23, Appellant showed through exhibits that she was 
definitely under coercion and duress when she paid the court costs to Respondent's attorneys. See 
R. Vol. II, pages 399-400 &406-407. Respondent once again has made no comment about these 
most damaging interactions of misconduct on the part of an attorney. Undoubtedly, Appellant's 
acts and actions were certainly involuntary, in the protection of not having her home threatened 
for payment of costs of attorneys fees illegally adjudicated by a district court judge who acted in 
excess and without jurisdiction or justification. 
Pursuant to the above points and authorities cited by Appellant, inclusive of Glancy the 
mere payment of costs does not waive error in proceedings, or right of appeal, irrespective 
whether it was voluntary or involuntary. 
Page 16 of22 
Therefore, the issue of mootness is moot, just as every other issue, defense or argument 
Respondent has brought without authority or proper explanation. 
But what about those persons who have robbed the Appellant under color of law and 
authority. Do they get off Scott free? I always thought the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
has inherent power to control its department and the people who are in it. Aren't District Court 
Judges Benjamin Simpson and John T. Mitchell, Magistrate Debra A. Heise, attorneys Toby 
McLaughlin and Stephen Snedden under your purview and control? They are all officers of the 
Court and part of your roster. 
Appellant has filed a Motion for Sanctions on this issue pursuant to IAR Rule 11.2 and is 
incorporated herein by its reference. It's content is self-explanatory and the relief sought should 
be granted to at least begin to have the Appellant partially brought whole from the damages done, 
if the Court wishes to observe its Mission Statement of having a justice system based on integrity 
and proper administration of justice. 
Here are some quotes from http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/bluebook/2004/05 judicial .pdf 
"The Supreme Court, as supervisor of the entire court system, establishes 
statewide rules and policies for the operation of its functions and that of the 
district courts." 
"The Supreme Court is responsible for the administration and supervision of 
the trial courts, as well as the operations of the staff of the Courts, ... " 
and my favorite ... 
"Appeals from small claims decisions are taken to a lawyer magistrate 
judge." [Emphasis Ours] Judicial Branch - Idaho Bluebook on the Internet. 
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II 
COSTS 
Respondent requests an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 is not a matter 
of right to the prevailing party, but is appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left 
with the abiding belief that the case was brought pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, 
or without foundation. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington Fed. Savings, 135 
Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001) When deciding whether the case was brought, pursued, or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, the entire course of the litigation must 
be taken into account. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 
518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001); McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 82 P.3d 833 (2003). "Attorney fees 
can be awarded on appeal under [§ 12-121] only if the appeal was brought or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Downey v. Vavold, 144 Idaho 592, 596, 166 
P.3d 382, 386 (2007). See also Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224,235,220 P.3d 580,591 (2009) 
("An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121 is not a matter of right to the prevailing 
party, but is appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that 
the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.") 
Thus, if there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded under 
J.C.§ 12-121 even though the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington Fed. 
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Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001 ). An appeal may also be deemed frivolous, and 
attorney fees awarded, for failure to properly comply with I.AR. 35(b )( 6). Sprinkler Irrigation 
Co. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 139 Idaho 691, 697, 85 P.3d 667, 673 (2004). Although an award of 
attorney fees under the statute is discretionary, the award must be supported by findings, and 
those findings, in tum, must be supported by the record. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 
792, 41 P.3d 220 (2002). 
It is obvious that Appellant brought this appeal without the intent to be "pursued, or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." But, you cannot say the same for the 
Respondent. Most of his argument was defended frivolously and unreasonably without 
foundation or any substantial on-point authority whatsoever. Respondent has unnecessarily 
placed Appellant under extreme duress and financial hardship, more than just Walter's welching 
out on a promissory note of considerable value. 
Now, they have stolen $10,000 for costs on appeal under color of law that would have 
only had a maximum limit of $75.00 on an appeal from Small Claims Department as prescribed 
in l.C. 1-2311 and IRCP Rule 81 (q) - attorneys fees of $25.00 and maximum costs of $50.00 as 
per. IRCP Rule 81 (p) by and through a district Court judge acting without jurisdiction or 
authority, is shocking conduct of an outrageous manner. Even more outrageous was being placed 
under threat, duress and coercion by Respondent that if I didn't pay the $10,000, I could lose my 
home. 
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This is the main reason for bringing this appeal is to get back my $10,000 and costs on 
appeal. All that was taught to Walter was that he can make agreements and not keep them without 
any repercussions to him. That is how real criminals are made. No discipline and morals taught at 
youth and now none as an adult. And the victim is left defending herself, not to be even more of a 
victim. 
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) provides in part: "In any civil action to recover m a 
commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed 
reasonable attorney fees to be set by the court." The language of I.C. § 12-120(3) is mandatory 
and requires a trial court to award attorney fees to the prevailing party. Inland Title Co. v. 
Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 779 P.2d 15 (1989); Torix v. Allred, 100 Idaho 905,911,606 P.2d 1334, 
1340 (1980). A commercial transaction is defined "to mean all transactions except transactions 
for personal or household purposes." I.C. § 12-120(3). Attorney fees are not appropriate under 
I.C. § 12-120(3) unless the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the 
basis upon which the party is attempting to recover. Brower v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 
117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 ( 1990); See Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch v. Kelsey, 131 
Idaho 657,962 P.2d 1041 (1998). 
Respondent's general assertion to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-
120(3) is insufficient to request attorney fees on appeal, where the specific portion of the statute 
relied upon is not identified and, if necessary, supported by argument as to why it is applicable. 
Stephen v. Sallaz & Gate1-11ood, Chtd., 150 Idaho 521, 529-30, 248 P.3d 1256, 1264-65 (2011); 
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Appel v. LePage, 135 Idaho 133, 139, 15 P.3d 1141, 1147 (2000). Second, that statute only 
provides for the award of attorney fees to the prevailing party, Storey Constr., Inc. v. Hanks, 148 
Idaho 401,411,224 P.3d 468,478 (2009). 
This Court has previously refused to award fees where the appellants had raised novel, 
legitimate issues of law related to the adoption statutes. Roe Family Servs. v. Doe, 139 Idaho 930, 
939, 88 P.3d 749, 758 (2004). 
I request the Court to award Costs of expenses as requested in Appellant's initial Brief. 
and the Respondent be awarded nothing new in this case. I also request the Court to grant my 
Motion for Sanctions with justice in mind. 
Dated this 3rd day of February, 2014. 
Appearing In Propria Persona 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of February, 2014, I caused to be served and delivered the 
original and Six (6) true and correct copies of the Appellant's Reply Brief on Appeal and One (1) 
unbound, unstapled copy to the Supreme Court and Two (2) true and correct copies of the 
Appellant's Brief on Appeal to each party; and Certificate of Service; by the method as indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Toby McLaughlin 
Berg and McLaughlin 
321 South First Avenue 
Sandpoint, near [83864] 
State of Idaho 
The Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Post Office Box 83 720 
Boise, near [83720-0101] 
State of Idaho 
By: 
Errol Owen 
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[ ] U.S. Mail 
[)<l Hand Delivered 
[ ] FAX Tel: 
.IX] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
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